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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
9 WESTERN DIVISION  
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11 LEHMONT MAHEIA, individually and )  
12 on behalf of all others similarly situated, )

13 Plaintiff, )

14 v. )

15 SWISSPORT USA, INC., and Doe One )  
16 through and including Doe One )  
17 Hundred, )

Defendants. )

Case No. CV 11-07823-ODW (FMOx)

Order **GRANTING** Plaintiff's Motion  
for Leave to File First Amended  
Complaint [29]

18 **I. Introduction**

19 Plaintiff's Motion for leave to file his First Amended Complaint is before the  
20 Court. The Amended Complaint adds several items and clarifies the original complaint.  
21 First, it adds class action allegations that Defendants failed to pay class action members  
22 minimum wages and overtime for time spent traveling to and from employee parking lots  
23 and airport security. Second, it adds a fifth cause of action for off-the-clock claims under  
24 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207, on behalf of Plaintiff individually and as a collective  
25 action under the opt-in provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216. Third, it narrows the putative  
26 subclasses to ramp agents at Los Angeles International Airport. Fourth, it adds a second  
27 meal period subclass. Fifth, it clarifies Plaintiff's late final pay claim.

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## II. Factual Background

Under the Court's scheduling order, Plaintiff may amend his pleadings on or before January 23, 2012. Dkt. No. 11. Because December 26, 2011 (28 days prior to the deadline) was a legal holiday, the last day for Plaintiff to file his Motion was the previous Friday, December 23, 2011. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6; L.R. 6-1. Yet, Plaintiff overlooked this and filed the Motion on Monday, December 26, 2011.

Parties met pursuant to L.R. 7-3 on December 16, 2011, discussing certain amendments to the complaint. Counsel conferred at least one additional time prior to the filing of the Motion. Unable to reach a stipulated agreement, Plaintiff filed this Motion requesting leave to amend.

## III. Discussion

### A. Legal standard for motion for leave to amend

When the right to amend as a matter of course has been extinguished, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's consent or with the court's leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But, Rule 15(a) is "very liberal"—courts should "freely give leave when justice so requires." *AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc.*, 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Still, courts need not grant leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or, (4) is futile. *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Of these factors, prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight. *Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.*, 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Without a showing of prejudice, or strong evidence of any of the other factors, there is a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend. *Id.*

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1                   **B. Defendants fail to articulate any prejudice to them as a result of the**  
2                   **amended complaint**

3           Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff's amendments to clarify its late final pay claim  
4 and to narrow the putative subclasses to ramp agents at Los Angeles International  
5 Airport. Defs.' Opp'n at 1. Indeed, these amendments assist the litigants and the Court,  
6 and are welcomed. For the other amendments, the Court is not convinced Defendants  
7 will be prejudiced, or that Defendants even argued that it would be prejudiced.

8           At best, Defendants assert Plaintiff's FLSA claim would transform the case into  
9 a "hybrid collective action", causing confusion. *Id.* at 10. It would seem, if there would  
10 be any confusion, that this confusion would be directed to and would not prejudice  
11 Defendants. For instance, this Court may someday regret that it allowed the case to  
12 proceed as both a FLSA collective action and a state law class action. Likewise, potential  
13 participants to the litigation might be troubled with the hybrid opt-in/opt-out procedure.  
14 But, there is no evidence that Defendants would be prejudiced.

15           Courts have found, when based on related underlying facts, a FLSA claim can  
16 proceed simultaneously with state law class action claims. *See Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs.*,  
17 632 F.3d 971, 977-78 (7th Cir. 2011). Further, it is not unduly demanding for potential  
18 participants to "make two binary choices"—to opt-in the FLSA claims and opt-out of the  
19 state law claims. *Id.* at 978.

20           Defendants also appear to argue that including the FLSA will bring forth extra  
21 litigants and laws into the case. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. While the  
22 causes of action may differ somewhat, the underlying facts supporting both the FLSA and  
23 state law claims are closely related, if not identical. It is not a high burden to work the  
24 same set of facts into two separate legal paradigms. Accordingly, the Court finds no  
25 prejudice to the Defendants by granting leave to amend.

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